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This paper constructs a heterogenous agent model of endogenous distrib-
ution and growth. When the labor leisure choice of agents is exogenous, the
factor holding ratios of households converges to a mass point that is indepen-
dent of the initial distribution of capital in the steady state. There is complete
equality and every household’s preferred tax rate equals the growth maximiz-
ing tax rate. There is no distributive conﬂict in the long run. When the labor
leisure choice of households is endogenous, there is also complete convergence
in the factor holding ratios of agents in the steady state. This implies that
there is unanimity over preferred tax rates as in the previous case, although
the preferred tax rate of households is less than the growth maximizing tax
rate. We identify the intuition behind this result. Our results also extend the
model of endogenous distribution and growth in Das and Ghate (2004) in two
ways. First, we assess the impact of redistributive politics on growth by looking
at the eﬀect of income inequality on the tax rate and labor supply. Second, the
model is solved using a more empirically plausible speciﬁcation of the govern-
ment budget constraint in which households vote over the tax rate on capital
income instead of a tax on wealth. The general insight gained from the analy-
sis is that characterizing the transitional dynamics in a model of redistributive
politics and growth is not an intractable proposition.
Keywords: Distributive Conﬂict, Endogenous Distribution, Median Voter Theo-
rem, Endogenous Growth
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Number: P16: Political Econ-
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11 Introduction
Following the seminal work of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) - henceforth AR - a large
body of theoretical work has addressed the impact of income distribution on eco-
nomic growth via the implied pressure for redistribution.1 However, in summarizing
the recent literature on income distribution and growth, Drazen (2000, p. 473), ob-
serves that several growth and distribution models (where inequality is deﬁned in
terms of the functional distribution of income), “lack transitional dynamics”, a fea-
ture “dictated ... by the diﬃculty in solving for a simultaneous political and economic
equilibrium.” Das and Ghate (2004) - henceforth DG - to the best of our knowledge,
are the ﬁrst authors to add transitional dynamics to the growth and distribution
framework of AR. DG show that the steady state factor holding ratios across agents
converges to a mass point that is independent of the initial distribution of capital. Be-
cause there is convergence in factor holding ratios in DG, every household’s preferred
tax rate is the same, and equal to the growth maximizing tax rate in the long run.
There is no distributive conﬂict. This contrasts with AR, in which the steady state
factor holding ratios of agents is pinned down by the initial distribution of capital
across agents. This perpetuates distributive conﬂict.
1See Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa (1999) for an extensive review.Growth and Distributive Politics 3
This paper constructs a model of redistributive politics and growth with tran-
sitional dynamics along the lines of DG with two diﬀerences. First, we endogenize
the household’s labor-leisure choice. This makes the growth rate, the distribution
of wealth, labor supply, and the tax rate are simultaneously endogenous.2 Such a
framework allows us to study the impact of income distribution on growth via the
impact that redistributive politics has on both the tax rate as well as distortions to
labor supply. Second, we consider a more empirically plausible speciﬁcation of the
government budget constraint in which public infrastructure - the source of labor
augmentation in the model - is ﬁnanced by a tax on capital income as opposed to a
tax on the capital stock. Like DG, the equilibrium tax rate is determined by majority
voting.
The model leads to several interesting results. When labor is exogenous, we show
that the factor holding ratios of agents converges to a mass point that is independent of
the initial distribution of capital, like Stiglitz (1969). This implies that there is perfect
convergence of interest across individuals about the tax rate, or unanimity. There is
no distributive conﬂict in the long run. These results are consistent with DG. When
2This contrasts with both AR and DG. In AR, the growth rate and the tax rate are endoge-
nous, while distribution is exogenous. In DG, the growth rate, the tax rate, and distribution are
endogenous, but labor is exogenous.Growth and Distributive Politics 4
we endogenize leisure, there is still perfect convergence in the factor holding ratio’s
of agents, i.e., the median and average household’s factor holding ratios coincide in
the steady state. However, since households value leisure, their preferred tax rate is
lower than the growth maximizing tax rate as households work less and choose to tax
themselves less. This leads to lower growth.
In terms of the impact of inequality on growth, our results suggest that more
inequality leads to lower growth, as in DG and AR. This is because a capital poor
median voter prefers a high tax on capital income, which is larger than the growth
maximizing tax rate. However, in the long run, because the median agent ‘catches
up’ to the average agent, his preferred tax on capital income falls, and growth rises.
However, in the steady state, because agents value leisure, they work less. Hence,
they choose to tax themselves less. This leads to lower growth, as factor holding ratio
convergence occurs on the left hand side of the growth maximizing tax rate, even
though there is more equality in the long run. This implies that more equality leads
to lower growth; although more equality ﬁrst leads to higher growth and then lower
growth in the steady state.3
3The non-linear eﬀect of growth and inequality is consistent with recent empirical evidence that
suggests that while too much equality can be harmful for growth, too much inequality can also be
harmful for growth (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2003).Growth and Distributive Politics 5
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3
characterizes the optimal tax rate of households under endogenous and exogenous
leisure. Section 4 discusses the implication for optimal tax rates on growth and
inequality in the long run. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We ﬁrst solve the household’s problem with labor is supplied endogenously. The
population, or number of households, N, is given. Each household is diﬀerentiated on
the basis of its capital holdings, Kh, whose distribution is assumed to be continuous
on a ﬁnite support, R+. We assume that the distribution of Kh is skewed to the
right, which implies that the median household’s capital holdings is less than the
mean household’s.4 The aggregate stock of capital is given by K =
N
1 Kh. Capital
is the only accumulable factor in the model.






where Yt is aggregate output at time period t, Kt denotes the aggregate capital
4As will be seen later, this construct permits us to use the capital-labor holding of the median
voter relative to the mean voter as an index of wealth inequality in the model.Growth and Distributive Politics 6
stock in the economy, Ht is the aggregate labor supply in each period, and Gt is
a public infrastructure input which is the source of labor augmentation. Following
the endogenous growth literature, we interpret K as both physical as well as human
capital. Hence a ∈ [0,1] is the private return to physical capital as well as human





to ensure that the return to capital is positive in equilibrium.5
We assume that the public infrastructure input, G, is ﬁnanced by a speciﬁc tax,
τ ∈ [0,1], on capital income in each period. This speciﬁcation is more empirically
plausible, and departs from both AR and DG, who assume that infrastructure is
ﬁnanced by a tax on the capital stock, or wealth. The government budget constraint
is balanced in each period, and given by
Gt = τtrtKt, (3)
where rt is the competitive rate of return to capital. Given (1), the rental rate to
5With a narrower interpretation of K as physical capital, it would be empirically implausible to
assume that a>1
2, but it is not so when capital is interpreted more broadly as we do here. Further,
according to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 38), even a value of α = .75 is quite reasonable.Growth and Distributive Politics 7




















t .6 This allows us to







Without any loss of generality, we assume that capital depreciates fully in each period.
Following Aghion and Bolton (1997), agents are assumed to live for a single period.
In each period, household’s are endowed with a single unit of time which they allocate
optimally between labor and leisure. At the end of the period, a replica of each agent
is born, for which agents leave a bequest. Hence, at time t,t h ehth household derives
utility over consumption, Cht,ab e q u e s tKht+1, and leisure, 1 − Hht,w h e r eHht is
the amount of labor supplied by the hth household in time period t. The utility
function U :I R
3
+ → R+ satisﬁes the standard properties, and is assumed to be Cobb-
Douglas. The timing of events is as follows. Production occurs at the beginning of
6Note that both the return to capital and the wage rate are in increasing in the tax rate.Growth and Distributive Politics 8
each period. Once production occurs, households make their consumption, bequest,
and labor supply decisions, and then die. We assume that the tax rate is known
before households make their consumption, bequest, and labor supply decisions.








Cht + Kht+1 ≤ wtHht + rt(1 − τt)Kht, (8)









{wtHht + rt(1 − τt)Kht}, (10)
and




Equations (9), (10), and (11), summarize the individual household equations in the
model. Equation (9) is the Euler equation for consumption. Equation (10) is the
household capital accumulation equation: it says that next period’s capital is propor-
tional to current disposable income (i.e., wage income plus after-tax capital income).Growth and Distributive Politics 9
Equation (11) is the household labor supply equation and is increasing in the tax rate
on capital income: i.e.,
∂Hht
∂τt > 0.
To obtain the aggregate labor supply and capital accumulation equations, we ag-
gregate across households. Noting that
N
1 Hht = Ht, using (6), and re-arranging
equation (11) leads to an expression for aggregate labor supply determined endoge-
nously as a function of the tax rate,
Ht = H(τt)=
N(α + β)(1 − a)
(1 − a)+a(1 − α − β)(1 − τt)
. (12)
Let δ(τt)=( 1−a)+a(1−α−β)(1−τt).7 Intuitively, a rise in the tax rate reduces a
household’s return to capital, and therefore its capital income. This leads households
to supply more labor. When α + β = 1, households do not value leisure, and supply
their entire time endowment as labor exogenously. This implies that Ht = N,o rt h a t
the aggregate labor supply is simply the household per-period time endowment (1)












Equations (12) and (13) denote the aggregate decision rules for labor and capital,
7When τ =1 ,H = N(α + β), and when τ =0 ,H =
N(α+β)(1−a)
(1−a)+(1−α−β) <N (α + β). It is easy to
verify that H

(τ) > 0 ∀τ ∈ [0,1].Growth and Distributive Politics 10
respectively.
We now obtain the growth maximizing tax rate. Deﬁne the economy growth rate
as gt+1 =
Kt+1
Kt . To obtain an expression for gt+1, we begin with the household capital
accumulation equation, (10). Substituting out the expression for Hht (using (11) in
(10)), aggregating across households, and simplifying implies
Kt+1 = β{Nwt + rt(1 − τt)Kt}. (14)
From equation (6), the wage rate can be expressed as wt =
(1−a)Ktrt
aHt .U s i n g t h i s
expression for wt, the expression for the rental rate in (4), and substituting the ex-
pression for Ht from (12) into equation (14) implies that
gt+1 = constant ·{ (1 − a)+a(1 − τt)}(τtHt)
1−a
a , (15)




a . Equation (15) in con-
junction with equation (12) determines the long run endogenous growth rate of the
economy. Note that the growth-tax curve takes the inverse U-shape form (like Barro
(1990)), which leads to a unique growth maximizing tax rate. This is because the tax
rate enters both positively (both directly as well as through aggregate labor supply)
as well as negatively in expression (15). The positive eﬀect of a higher tax rate comes
from the growth enhancing eﬀect of more infrastructure (G), as well as the positiveGrowth and Distributive Politics 11
eﬀect of higher labor supply from (12). However, when the tax rate on capital in-
come becomes suﬃciently high, this reduces the net return to capital, which reduces
investment and growth. Hence, there exists a unique growth maximizing tax rate,
which we denote as τe
g.
2.1 Exogenous Labor-Leisure
We now solve the problem when agents supply their entire time endowment inelasti-
cally in each period, i.e., α+β = 1. When labor is exogenous, the wage rate is given





t , while the return to capital is given




a, where we have normalized N = 1. Deriving the house-
hold decision rules like before, and aggregating the household capital accumulation








1−a − τtrt]Kt. (16)
Deﬁne the growth rate gt+1 =
Kt+1
Kt . It is straightforward to verify from (16) that the







8To obtain an expression for the growth maximizing tax rate, note that by Euler’s theorem,
Yt = ∂Y
∂KKt + ∂Y
∂HHt = rtKt + wt w h e r ew en o r m a l i z eH to 1. This implies wt + rt(1 − τt)Kt =
wt + rtKt − τtrtKt = Yt − rtKt. Substituting out for Yt and diﬀerentiating with respect to the tax
rate yields the desired result.Growth and Distributive Politics 12
where τg
x denotes the growth maximizing tax rate when α + β =1 .
We now provide a suﬃcient condition for the existence of a unique growth maxi-
mizing tax rate under endogenous labor-leisure (α + β<1) and compare it with the
growth maximizing tax rate under exogenous labor-leisure (α + β =1 ) .








Suppose α + β<1.I f 2a − 1 >a (1 − α − β)(1 − a), then there exists a unique
growth maximizing tax rate under endogenous labor leisure which exceeds the growth









Proof. See Appendix. .
As shown in the appendix, the growth maximizing tax rate is obtained from
diﬀerentiating the expression for the growth rate with respect to τt in (15). AfterGrowth and Distributive Politics 13






(1 − a)[(1 − a)+a(1 − α − β]
aτt   
MB
. (20)
Note when α+β = 1, or labor is supplied exogenously by households, then the above
expression becomes,
(1 − a)








which leads to the growth maximizing tax rate when α + β =1 :τg
x = 1−a
a .
It is more convenient to re-write equation (20) as9
(1 − a){aτt − (1 − a)}
  
MC




Equation (22) can be used to plot the marginal cost and beneﬁt schedules corre-
sponding to the growth maximizing tax rate under α + β<1a n dα + β =1 . T h i s
is illustrated in Figure (1). The growth maximizing tax rate is obtained when the
marginal beneﬁt of an increase in the tax rate on capital income is exactly equal to
the marginal cost of higher taxes. However, as (22) shows, changes in α + β only
aﬀect the marginal beneﬁt schedule, and not the marginal cost schedule. In particu-
lar, as α + β → 1, the marginal beneﬁt of higher taxes falls for each value of the tax
rate. This leads to a reduction in the growth maximizing tax rate. When α + β =1 ,
9See the appendix for details.Growth and Distributive Politics 14
Figure 1: The Growth Maximizing Tax Rate under Exogenous and En-
dogenous Labor-Leisure
the marginal beneﬁt schedule intersects the marginal cost schedule at τg
x = 1−a
a :i n
this case, the marginal beneﬁt is a horizontal line and equal to zero for all feasible
values of the tax rate. Intuitively, when labor is endogenous, the tax rate maximizes
the net return to capital as well as aggregate labor supply. Under exogenous labor
supply, aggregate labor is invariant with respect to the tax rate. Hence, the growth
maximizing tax rate is greater when labor-leisure is endogenous.10
10However, by endogenizing leisure, the growth tax curves are no longer identical. To see this,
from (12), when α + β =1 ,H = N.W h e n α + β<1, Ht =
N(1−a)(1−α−β)
δ(τt) <N , ∀τ ∈ [0,1] as
(1−a)(1−α−β)
δ(τt) < 1. This implies that the growth-tax curve under endogenous leisure lies everywhere
below the growth-tax curve under exogenous leisure.Growth and Distributive Politics 15
3 Optimal Tax Rate under Majority Voting when
α + β<1.
We would like to verify whether the equilibrium tax rate under majority voting yields
the growth maximizing tax rate when α + β<1, and α + β = 1, as derived in
Proposition (1). We ﬁrst consider the case where α + β<1, and derive the transi-
tional dynamics governing the law of motion of household capital holdings. We then
characterize the optimal tax rate.
Like DG, for any household, h,l e tηht =
Kht
Kt , ηh ∈ [0,1], denote the relative capital
holdings of the hth household relative to the aggregate capital stock.11 The dynamic








Equation (23) is the index of inequality in the model and governs the transitional
dynamics of relative capital holdings of the hth household.13
Proposition 2 In the steady state, the factor holding ratios of agents converge to a
11When ηh = 1, then the hth household owns the entire capital stock.
12We divide (10) by (13) and simplify to get (23).
13It is easy to verify from equation (23) that the transition to the steady state is monotonic and
there is a unique stable steady state.Growth and Distributive Politics 16







This holds for all feasible values of the tax rate.
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition (2) shows that irrespective of the initial distribution of capital, all
agents become identical in the steady state. In the long run, every agent is a ‘rep-
resentative’ agent, and identical with respect to their relative capital holdings. This
implies complete equality as in the steady state every household will be endowed with
the same share of the capital stock, 1
N, and labor hours as the average household.14
This is also true for the median household.
To derive an expression for the equilibrium tax rate under median voting, we
ﬁrst obtain the indirect utility function of households. We ﬁrst manipulate the utility
function to write it as logUht = Vht = constant+log[
Kht+1
wt ]+(α+β)log(wt). Note that
Kht+1
wt = Hht +
rt(1−τt)









14These results are similar to the results of Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) who also obtain complete
equality in the steady state. In their model - like here - income distribution evolves endogenously.
As income distribution becomes more equal, tax rates decline. Further, increased inequality may be
good for growth, provided that this implies more support for public education.Growth and Distributive Politics 17
Substituting these into the Vht = log(Uht) yields,





Kht(1 − τt)} +( α + β)log(wt). (25)
Substituting for Ht in (12) into the above expression and simplifying yields
Vht = constant + log{1+aN(α + β)
(1 − τt)
δ(τt)
ηht} +( α + β)log(wt). (26)
We assume that individual’s care not only about how their optimal choices aﬀect
individual labor supply, both aggregate H as well. It is suﬃcient to note that for
any given values of Kt and Kht the indirect utility function of single peaked with
respect to τt. By the median voter theorem, this implies that the median household’s
ideal tax rate is the equilibrium tax rate in the economy.15 This corresponds to the
political tax determined under majority voting.
Taking ηht as given, the optimal tax rate of household’s is obtained from the house-
hold’s ﬁrst order condition with respect to (26). The next proposition summarizes
the optimal tax rate of households.
Proposition 3 The optimal tax rate for the hth household, τht, is determined by the






{(1 − a)+a[(1 − α − β)+( α + β)Nηht](1 − τht)}
+(2a−1)(1−α−β)=g(ηht).
(27)
The optimal tax rate is decreasing in the relative capital holdings of the hth household.
Proof. See Appendix.
It will be easier to characterize the optimal tax of households relative to the growth
maximizing tax rate if we substitute δ(τt) into (27) and re-write it as,
(1 − a)[(1 − a)+a(1 − α − β)]




{(1 − a)+a[(1 − α − β)+( α + β)Nηht](1 − τht)}





Equation (28) characterizes the optimal tax rate of households. First, from (28) it is
easily veriﬁed that as ηh increases the optimal tax rate of households falls. Intuitively,
the right hand side of equation (27) corresponds to the marginal cost schedule of a rise
in the tax rate facing households. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation
(27) in increasing in ηh. Hence, a higher ηh pushes the marginal cost up for each tax
rate. This reduces the household’s preferred tax rate.16 This is intuitive: the more
16Hence, τht = g(ηht)
  
−
,w h e r eght is deﬁned in (27).Growth and Distributive Politics 19
capital rich households are, the less their preferred tax on capital.
Second, equation (28) allows us to rank households in terms of their capital hold-
ings and preferred tax rates. For capital-rich households (relative to the mean),
ηh > 1
N. This implies their preferred tax on capital will be less than a capital poor
household whose capital holdings are less than the average, ηh <
1
N.T h i s i s b e -
cause the marginal cost for an increase in the tax rate is higher for the capital rich
households. Hence, their preferred tax on capital is less compared to a capital poor
household.
From Proposition 2 however, the households’ factor holding ratios converge to
the steady state where ηh = 1
N. Hence, the median household’s preferred tax rate is
identical to the mean households preferred tax rate in the steady state. Substituting
ηh = 1
N into (27), the preferred tax rate of all households in the steady state is given
by
(1 − a)[(1 − a)+a(1 − α − β)]












This is also the median household’s preferred tax rate since all households are identical
in the steady state. Setting h = m in (29) yields the political tax rate, i.e., the
optimal tax rate of the median voter in the steady state. Like DG and AR, we deﬁneGrowth and Distributive Politics 20
distributive conﬂict as the diﬀerence between the median household’s preferred tax
rate and the growth maximizing tax rate. Note that the median voter’s preferred
tax rate under majority voting in the steady state is determined by (29), while the
growth maximizing tax rate is determined by equation (15). We re-write (15) as
(1 − a)[(1 − a)+a(1 − α − β)]






a2(1 − α − β)(1 − τ)
1 − aτt   
MC
. (30)
The left hand side of both (30) and (29) denote the marginal beneﬁt schedule from
higher taxes. Note that the marginal beneﬁt schedule for changes in the tax rate in
the steady state for households is identical to the marginal beneﬁt schedule from the
growth maximizing tax rate. The diﬀerence lies in the marginal cost schedules of the
growth maximizing tax rates and the marginal cost schedule for households in the
steady state. In particular, since
a(1−τ)
(1−aτ) < 1, for all τ ∈ [0,1], the marginal cost a
rise in the tax rate is higher for households in the steady state for each level of the
tax rate, with the diﬀerence between the two marginal cost functions an increasing
function of the tax rate. Thus, for higher values of the tax rate, the optimal tax of
households in the steady state - as well as the median household’s preferred tax rate
- is less than the growth maximizing tax rate.
Proposition 4 Let α + β<1. In the steady state, the preferred tax rates of allGrowth and Distributive Politics 21
Figure 2: The Steady State Tax Rate versus the Growth Maximizing
Tax Rate
households - including the median - converges to the ‘average’ household’s preferred
tax rate. However, this tax rate is strictly less than the growth maximizing tax rate,
τg
e.
Figure (2) illustrates the dynamics behind Proposition (4). Intuitively, since
households value leisure, they work less. Hence, they chose to tax themselves less.
We start with the marginal cost schedule of a household who owns very little but
positive amounts of capital.17 As households become more capital rich, the marginal
cost of higher taxes rise, and so the preferred tax on capital falls until it equals the
17When the hth owns no capital, i.e., ηh = 0, his marginal cost curve is ﬂat. In this case, his
preferred tax on capital approaches 1.Growth and Distributive Politics 22
growth maximizing tax rate. This is where the marginal cost schedules of both the
growth maximizing tax rate and the hth household’s tax rate coincide. However in
the steady state because households value leisure they work less. Their preferred tax
on capital is less than the growth maximizing tax rate which reﬂects the household’s
preference for leisure.
3.1 Optimal Tax rate under Majority Voting when
α + β =1 .





¯ ξ(τt)+ ¯ φ(τt)(1 − τt)
}. (31)
This implies that ηht =1 ,∀h in the steady state. There is complete equality in the
steady state. To determine the optimal tax rate of households, we obtain the ﬁrst
order conditions of households with respect to their preferred tax rates. The indirect
utility function of households is given by,
Vht = constant + log{1+
a
1 − a
(1 − τt)Htηht} +( α + β)log(wt). (32)






=( α + β)
1 − a
a
τt. (33)Growth and Distributive Politics 23
Setting α + β = 1 implies that the optimal tax of the hth household is given by,







which shows that the optimal tax rate is decreasing in the relative capital holdings
of the hth household. Setting h = m and ηmt = 1 into this expression implies that
τm
x = 1−a
a , which is the median household’s preferred tax rate. Note that this is
identical to the growth maximizing tax rate, (18), in the steady state .
Proposition 5 When α + β =1 , the growth maximizing tax rate is identical to the
equilibrium tax rate under majority voting in the steady state. There is no distributive
conﬂict in the long run.
Proposition (5) suggests that distributive conﬂict vanishes in the long run when
α+β = 1, which is consistent with DG. Interestingly, both the growth maximizing tax
rate as well as the optimal tax rate for households in the steady state are independent
of β when α + β = 1. This is not the case when household value leisure: as can be
seen from (29), the optimal tax of households depends on β.Growth and Distributive Politics 24
4 Inequality and Growth
The above results allow us to characterize impact of inequality on growth. We have
shown that when the median voter is capital poor relative to the average household,
his preferred tax rate on capital will exceed the growth maximizing tax rate. Hence,
more inequality leads to lower growth. However, over time, because redistribution
through the tax rate equalizes the factor holding ratios of agents, the median agent
becomes more capital rich, his preferred tax rate on capital falls, and growth rises.
Hence, if the initial distribution of capital holdings is highly skewed wit Km less than
K 1
N, there is higher inequality and lower growth. In the long run, the factor holding
ratio’s of all agents converge to a mass point. The median household becomes the
average household in the steady state. This implies their preferred tax rates are
identical. As in the exogenous labor - leisure case, there is no distributive conﬂict.
However, since households also value leisure, they chooses to work less and, hence,
choose a lower tax in the steady state. This reduces the tax rate under majority
voting relative to the growth maximizing tax rate. This leads to lesser growth. The
non-linear eﬀect of growth and inequality is consistent with recent empirical evidence
that suggests that the while too much inequality is harmful for growth, too muchGrowth and Distributive Politics 25
equality can also be harmful for growth (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2003).
Proposition 6 Suppose the initial distribution of capital is such that the median
household is capital poor, i.e., ηm < 1
N. Then higher inequality leads to lower growth.
In the long run, while there is more equality, the tax rate determined by majority
voting is less than the growth maximizing tax rate. There is higher equality but lower
growth in the steady state.
Note that a social planner would not want to raise taxes to achieve the growth max-
imizing tax rate, since raising taxes would not be optimal for households.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper constructs a general model of distributive conﬂict and economic growth
along the lines of AR and DG. The novel feature of this paper is that the growth
rate, the tax rate, labor supply, and distribution, are all endogenous. Several inter-
esting results emerge. First, unanimity, or the convergence of household speciﬁc factor
holding ratios continues to hold. This implies greater political consensus over policy
choices in the long run. However, the equilibrium tax rate is less than the growth
maximizing tax rates when agents value leisure which leads to distributive conﬂict in
the steady state. The results of this paper extend the work of Das and Ghate (2004)Growth and Distributive Politics 26
in which the labor-leisure choice is exogenous. We also use a more plausible speciﬁ-
cation of the government budget constraint where we tax capital income instead of
wealth (the capital stock). The model suggests that if the median voter is suﬃciently
poor, higher inequality will lead to lower growth. However, because distribution is
endogenous, in the steady state the political tax rate preferred by households falls
over time. This leads to more equality but lower growth in the steady state. Our
results show that characterizing the transitional dynamics in a model of growth and
endogenous distribution is not an intractable proposition.Growth and Distributive Politics 27
A Proofs
Proof. Proposition (1). Log-diﬀerentiating (15) with respect to τt, and re-arranging,
yields the following ﬁrst order condition for the unique growth maximizing tax rate,
a





(1 − a)(1 − α − β)
δ(τt)
(35)






(1 − a)[(1 − a)+a(1 − α − β)]
aτt   
MB
. (36)
Substituting for δ(τt)=( 1− a)+a(1 − α − β)(1 − τt) above, equation (20) can be
simpliﬁed to
(1 − a){aτt − (1 − a)}
  
MC




Notice that changes in α and β only lead to changes in the marginal beneﬁt schedule.
Let α + β<1. To obtain Figure (1), , evaluating the left hand side of (37) when
τ = {0,1} implies LHS(0) = −(1 − a)2 and LHS(1) = (2a − 1)(1 − a), with the
marginal cost schedule increasing linearly in τ and intersecting the x-axis at τ = 1−a
a .
Evaluating the right hand side of (37) when τ = {0,1} implies RHS(0) = (1 −
α − β)a(1 − a)a n dRHS(1) = (1 − α − β)a(1 − a)2, with the marginal beneﬁt
schedule decreasing in τ,∀τ ∈ [0,1]. Notice that when τ = 1−a
a , the marginal beneﬁtGrowth and Distributive Politics 28
term is positive. Hence, τ = 1−a
a cannot be the growth maximizing tax rate. Since,
the marginal beneﬁt is falling, when α + β<1, the growth maximizing tax under
endogenous labor leisure exceeds the growth maximizing tax rate when labor-leisure
is exogenous.
Proof. Proposition (2). Setting ηht+1 = ηht = ηh in (23) implies that
Hht
Ht
= ηh ∀h. (38)











(1 − τt). (39)










ηht = 1, and simplifying
yields the result.
Proof. Proposition (3). The hth agent’s indirect utility function is given by,














−aN(α + β)(1 − a)ηht
{a[(1 − α − β)+( α + β)Nηht](1 − τht)}
1
δ(τht)
. (42)Growth and Distributive Politics 29




























δ(τht) . Substituting these expressions back
into (43), noting (42), and re-arranging terms yields (27).Growth and Distributive Politics 30
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